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Book Review and Commentary

James D. Ghiardi*

The Injury Industry And The Remedy Of No-Fault Insurance. By Jeffrey O'Connell Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 1971. Pp. xii, 156. Cloth $15.00.

Basically, there is nothing new in this latest of a series by Professor O'Connell
including the title, The Injury Industry, which was first used in a 1960 article
by the two University of Michigan researchers Conard and Voltz,, and which
was made popular by the Defense Research Institute in 1965.2
The 156 pages of text follow the same pattern of bombast as numerous other
O'Connell writings which decry failures of the organized bar without qualification and which exaggerate abuses without advancing detailed measures for
improvement. The ultimate advice, as usual, is that the no-fault plan of Professors Robert E. Keeton of Harvard's Law School and of O'Connell, Basic
Protection For The Traffic Victim, is the soothing balm for all of mankind's
3
problems which arise from automobile accidents and the tort litigation method.
Despite the Foreword by Daniel P. Moynihan which insists that this is a "thoroughly lawyerlike book," ' those who are deeply interested in the constructive
approach will be puzzled by such chapter headings as the following: "The Maw
of the Law"; "'Who Dunnit?'"; "A Pound of Flesh (All About Lawyers'
Contingent Fees)"; and "The Untouchables (All About Assigned Risks)." This
type of language may sell books, but it pollutes any constructive thought.
*

Professor of Law, Marquette University Research Director, Defense Research Institute. Inc.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
I. Conard & Voltz, The Economics of Injury Litigation. 39 MICH. ST. BAR J. 32 (Aug. 1960).
2. DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE [DRI] SPECIAL REPORT, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE
LAW EXPLOSION (Oct. 1965).
3. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
4. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY at xii (1971) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL].
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Professor O'Connell reciprocates in his text with numerous favorable references to Moynihan's works. His usual approach is to cite ponderously those
who favor his position and decry all points advanced by those who dare to
challenge it.
In addition to rapping the knuckles of those who support the legal method,
O'Connell throws his support t9 the favorites of the day who supposedly will
end bloodshed on the highways through "no-fault" and the advice of Department of Transportation payees. Responding to Moynihan's praise, "As a professor of law, he had instantly grasped the complex significance of the problem
of highway safety," O'Connell fingers the beads bought at the Klein and Waller
establishment' and opts for changing the environment rather than attempting
to influence the errant driver:
The best thinking on traffic safety today would put the lowest priority on trying to change the driver. And it would put the lowest
priority in trying to change the driver on trying to change the drinking driver; and it must put the lowest priority in trying to change
the drinking driver on trying to change the drinking driver through
threats concerning insurance claims.'
Perhaps a clever, and certainly a wordy approach to the problem, this advocacy
neglects at least the works of two scholars in the field which demonstrate that
"no-fault" would indeed increase the carnage caused on our highways by the
7

automobile.

It also is revealing that all public opinion polls which show public support
for the fault concept are slanted, while the ultimate is that of the-University of
Illinois Survey Research Center which was co-authored by O'Connell himself.'
Picking up Moynihan's expletives that the courts are overwhelmed,
swamped, inundated, and choked,9 Professor O'Connell adds that "the courts,
after all, are not clogged with any but auto insurance claims," 10 despite com5.

U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY

1970) (Prepared by D. Klein and J. Waller).
6. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 134.
7. Lawton, Psychological Aspects of the Fault System As Compared with the No-Fault System
of Automobile Insurance. 1969 DRI SPECIAL REPORT No. I I [summary published by DRI as
Fault-A Deterrent to Highway Accidents, 1969 DRI SPECIAL REPORT No. 10]; Mancuso, The
Concept of Culpability: Its Utility in Promoting Proper Roadway Use. 1971 DRI SPECIAL REPORT
No. 8 [summary published as Mancuso, Fault-A Basic Requisite of Sound Public Policy, 38 INS.
COUNSEl J. 397 (July 1971)]; Lawton, No-Fault Would Increase Accidents, 55 MARQ. L. REV.
__(1972).
CRASHES. (July

8. O'CONNELL, supra note 4,at 123; see O'Connell & Wilson, Public Opinion on No-Fault
Auto Insurance: A Survey of Surveys. 1970 U. ILL. L. FORUM 307; but see, Ross, Surveys.
Attitudes and Propaganda. 38 INS. COUNSEL J. 277 (Apr. 1971); Distorted Surveys No Gauge of
Public Opinion, 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 10 (Feb. 1969).
9.
O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at xi.
10. Id. at 8.
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mon knowledge that the real culprits are the growth of criminal as well as all
other types of lawsuits."
Apparently in the belief that men can be moved to agreement through being
pole-axed, Professor O'Connell dubs the present system cruel, corrupt, selfrighteous, dilatory, expensive, and wasteful." And the main bad actors in this
unstable and transient system are the attorneys. . .despite the bitter and often personal antagonism between plaintiffs' and insurance lawyers, they rally together in an unholy alliance
to preserve the fault system that serves them both so well.'
But the Bar Associations are also to blame:
The enforcement of the Canons of Ethics by Bar Associations for
any transgressions is minimal at best. But in the area of automobile
accidents-where violations have long been most notorious--enforement has long been a joke."
These broad-brush accusations are not supported by scholarly research but
are based on the research of the author of another best-seller. 5
Gather round, you unethical, ambulance-chasing, contingent fee hungry
practitioners of the law, a new era is dawning. The answer to your corruption
is "no-fault insurance, just as that is the answer to so many other ills plaguing
automobile insurance."'" Professor O'Connell supports his position by numerous citations to knowledgeable sources such as journalists, who do not recognize
the intricacies or full significance of total "no-fault" plans from their linotype
machines. Another worthy and "objective" source in full agreement with the
O'Connell ambition is the household "bible," Consumer Reports, published by
Consumers Union of which O'Connell is a director. The author's zeal for
overstatement and hard sell is comparable to the old-fashioned medicine man
selling a "total cure" elixir for one dollar per bottle.
After ridiculing those who point out that there is a relationship of the fault
concept to morality and individual responsibility, 7 O'Connell states that "the
principle of liability based on fault really stems in the United States from about
1850 with the case of Brown v. Kendall."' The fault principle runs much deeper
11. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT LITIGATION (Apr. 1970);
Court Congestion-A Localized Urban Problem. 9 FOR THE DEFENSE 49 (Sept. 1967); Ross, DRI
Studies Refute Court Delay Claims of Critics, 36 INS. COUNSEL J. 46 (Jan. 1969).
12. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 2.
13. Id.at 51.
14. Id. at 63.
15. M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968).
16. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 68.
17. Id. at 125.
18. Id.
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than a legal citation-Uncle Henry, Aunt Sophie and the youngster carrying
his books to grade school understand and accept the precept and none has heard
of Brown, let alone Kendall. Despite public recognition of a moral and legal
principle, O'Connell states,
especially in the case of automobile accidents, a moralistic approach with emphasis on an individual person's performance can be
a hugely wasteful and unrealistic focus . . . .Note, too, that nofault insurance does not abrogate criminal responsibility for reckless
driving, or administrative sanction such as the loss of a driver's
license. . .. After all, having people 'answer for their wrongs' by
having an insurance company pay in their stead is about as morally
effective as allowing people to hire substitutes to serve jail sentence."E
Certainly. these statements contain essential contradictions. They deny the
basic psychological premises that accepted social norms help to guide the individual, and that the process of confrontation found in the insurance-legal system adds deterrents to future unacceptable behavior. It must be noted that in
disregarding the moral concepts of the fault system, the author fails to call the
reader's attention to a book by his colleague, Professor Keeton. 20 Professor
Keeton points out that the purpose of tort law is "fair and just compensation
for losses. Sometimes it serves the cause of justice to shift a loss from one to
another; at other times, to leave it where it has fallen."'" He also states:
The evidence is inconclusive, but perhaps the most appealing inference is that the theme of fault is as ancient as law itself and that early
common law conceptions of responsibility for harms one had caused
were rustic definitions of fault. The notions of causation and fault
are close kin. Picking one or more responsiblecauses from the multitude of antecedents of a given incident is very close to finding fault."
Again he concludes:
Even in the writings of recent decades, as the negligence principle has
come under sharp and sharper challenge, support for basing liability
on negligence is traced primarily to a sense of what is just and fair,
and is explained not as a conclusion reasoned from other premises.
but as a perception consistent with prevailing values. Thus, the best
justification offered is an asserted empiric observation-that most
people believe fairness requires that one who carelessly causes harm
to another pay for it,
and that one who unintentionally causes injury
3
without carelessness be free of legal responsibility.
19.

Id. at 129-30.

20.

R. KEETON.

21. Id.
at 147.
22. Id.
at 149.
23. Id.
at 152.

VENTURING

To Do JUSTICE (1969).
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After indicating that payment for general damages, "pain and suffering," are
almost impossible to determine accurately, 4 even though the intangible value
of works of art are measured each day in the marketplace, Professor O'Connell
points out that "no-fault" payments would reduce endless and expensive arguments.?' The fact remains that "pain and suffering" does exist and that payment for it has been and should remain a part of the process of justice. The
"no-fault" system might reduce insurance costs, but it would be at the expense
of having the innocent victim suffer those costs in silence without compensation
26
from the one who caused the accident.
Professor O'Connell contends that the first-party insurance plans approved
to date at the state level are unsatisfactory-they fall short of his recommendations; there are flaws in the proposals of the American Bar Association or any
group that does not favor his brand of "revolutionary change." And perhaps
his true future intent, other than fulfilling the promise of another Moynihan
statement that "the clarity, openness and urgency of his arguments are the
marks of a man with an idea whose time is coming, ' 27 is shown in the following
statement:
In short, going beyond auto accidents for no-fault insurance gets us
into very uncharted fields very quickly. All the more reason, then,
to start with auto accidents where we are ready for it, where we can
see where we are going and where we can make judgments about
whether it is feasible to extend it to other areas.2"
No consideration is ever given to the position that O'Connell might be wrong
or that if his plan were adopted and proved a failure, thousands of innocent
people would be harmed and millions of dollars lost. Pragmatism of this nature
is not even hinted at by the author.
The balance of the book deals with such topics as the role of collateral
sources; whether auto insurance should be primary or secondary; and the foibles
of the insurance industry according to the estimates of the Department of
Transportation-including the ill-treatment of the underprivileged.
Occupying 68 pages of the volume is an epilogue apologetic for past statements, and four appendices. One appendix is a reprint of the favored Department of Transportation report to the President and Congress of March, 1971;
24.
25.

O'CONNELL,

supra note 4, at 3.

Id.at 95.

26. See REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT REPARATIONS at 87-90 (June 1969) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. REPORT]; DRI SPECIAL
REPORT, RESPONSIBLE REFORM-A

PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE LIABILITY REPARATION SYSTEM,

at 32-33 (Oct. 1969).

27.
28.

O'CONNELL.,

Id. at 146.

supra note 4, at xii.
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the other three call for changes from previously asserted positions. The covers
of both the hard and paperback versions are pretty, complete with the prominent display of the names, O'Connell and Moynihan.
I cannot recommend the book to either the student of the subject or to those
merely interested in the "no-fault" controversy. Better material is readily available even though the paper bound edition costs only $2.95.
The Injury Industry lumps all critics of the author's plan and all those who
seek reform through other than "revolutionary" methods into one black pot.
In another era, the inflammatory accusations would have been branded as
"McCarthyism." A serious student of the subject has stated the issue as follows:
To be on either extremity of the automobile insurance reform movement is to risk defeat or, worse, compromise. To be in the middle,
. . .is to risk abuse from all directions.
[Our] stance has been to try to help guide events so that change will
be based on solid concepts and not on half-truths, slogans or cliches.
John Stuart Mill foresaw the hazard that the middle ground offers
when he said:
"Whether men adhere to old opinions or adopt new ones, they have
• . .an invincible propensity to split the truth, and take half. ..;
and a habit of erecting their quills and bristling up like a porcupine
against anyone who brings them the other half. .. "2
All segments of the organized bar, individual attorneys, insurance companies,
insurance executives, political leaders, and responsible lay leaders have recognized the need for review of the automobile insurance reparations system. In
light of this review, changes and improvements have been sought. The hundreds
of serious proposals that have been advanced merit thoughtful analysis and
good faith consideration. Professor O'Connell does not do so in his book. This
work cannot be used in the classroom, in the courtroom or in the legislative
halls as a fair review and analysis of the current scene.
Space does not permit a summary and analysis of all the plans and proposals
that exist. Materials for this are available. However, proposals for reform
from the organized bar merit consideration. The American Bar Association has
issued a 240-page report outlining 54 proposed reforms. 3 ' Currently, the ABA
29. Thomas C. Morrill, F.ult and No-Fault-An Overdose of Advocacy, paper delivered to
the Executives' Club of Chicago (Oct. I, 1971).
30. See, e.g., T. RoKEs, NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971); A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 26;
ANALYSIS OF MAJOR AUTO COMPENSATION PROPOSALS 1971 DRI REPORT No. 9; Ghiardi &
Kircher, Automobile Insurance: The Rockefeller-Stewart Plan, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 324 (July 1970);
Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance: An Analysis of the Massachusetts Plan, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1135 (1970).
31. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 26.
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has a committee actively reviewing its prior report and recent developments. It
will submit its report and recommendations in the near future. The organized
plaintiffs' bar has sponsored reform." The American College of Trial Lawyers
has sought reform.3 3 In addition, the organized defense bar, through the Defense
Research Institute, has actively sought reform.
Since the positive program of the Defense Research Institute. Responsible
Relorln-A Program to Improve the Liability Reparation System. 3 has been
relegated to one footnote in Appendix IV." let me hasten to explain its basic
principles before it becomes distorted in still another book, with attendant
royalties. Responsible ReJorm contains promise of improved efficiency and
lower accident levels even though it has gained formal support by "avaricious"
members of three national defense attorney associations -International Association of Insurance Counsel, Federation of Insurance Counsel, and Association of Insurance Attorneys.
Responsible ReJorm rejects the nearly total self-insurance proposals of Professor O'Connell and calls for retention and improvement of the present system.
It is committed to the proposition that merely changing the system itself cannot
solve the problems it attempts to cope with. The public has been led to believe
that "no-fault" is a panacea for the ills caused by the automobile-alcoholism
on the highways. traffic congestion, court congestion, fragility of automobiles,
death on the highways-particularly to the young driver, inflation, etc. Reform
must reach all of these problems and not merely change the automobile liability
policy to an accident and health policy. Responsible Rejorm addresses itself to
these problems by:
(I) Providing that first-party (self-insurance) be made available for those who
need and want it, but that such programs not be funded by the elimination of
tort liability;
(2) Assuring that the cost of operating the system can be reduced by meaningful highway safety legislation aimed at accident producers, by more efficient use
of the judicial and legal effort, and by eliminating archaic rules of law and
procedures;
(3) Indicating that delay in our courts can be eliminated by the addition of
more judges and by the use of innovative procedures such as small claim arbitration;
32.
1971).
33.

AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMITTEE ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

34.
35.

AUTOMOBILE REPARATIONS STATUTES

DRI

SPECIAL REPORT, RESPONSIBLE REFORM.

O'CONNELL,

supra note 4, at 196.

(Mar. 1971).
supra note 26.

(Jan.

OF THE SPECIAL
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(4) Declaring that inequity in the law can be corrected by elimination of the
inequity and not the system itself.
The 11-point program of Responsible Rejorm. complete with sample legislation. can be summarized as follows:
Highway Sajety. The plan promotes safety through the development and implementation of specific research programs and legislation calling for: (I) mandatory license revocation and fines for those convicted of operating a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs; (2) permanent revocation of driving
privileges for habitual moving traffic law violators; (3) severe penalties for
pedestrians involved in motor vehicle accidents while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs; (4) uniform licensing standards for drivers with periodic
physical and mental examinations and testing; and (5) mandatory use of motor
vehicle safety equipment including safety belts and motorcycle safety helmets;
and with the support of programs and proposals of others, efforts will be made
to reduce the highway accident tolls by concentration upon motorists as a prime
cause of automobile accidents.
First-Party Coverage. Each automobile insurer should offer its insureds the
option to acquire minimum first party coverage for medical and hospital expenses. uninsured motorist protection. income disability and accidental death benefits for economic losses resulting from motor vehicle accidents. This insurance
should cover the named insured, members of his family residing in his household, and guest passengers injured while occupying the insured vehicle.
Court Congestion and Delay. Through appropriate legislative action means
should be established to: (I) provide a sufficient number of judges to keep
abreast of the increasing judicial work load occasioned by population growth;
and (2) employ mandatory arbitration of all suits which involve claims under
3000 dollars in jurisdictions troubled with court delay. Through additional
research the root causes of court delay will be isolated in those jurisdictions in
which it exists.
Contingent Fee Regulation. Contingent fees and procedures for their use should
be regulated in the following manner: (I) the amount of the fee should be strictly
regulated by appropriate local court rule or legislation; (2) every retainer on a
contingent basis should be in writing in a fixed format and signed by the client;
(3) a retainer statement should be filed with the appropriate judicial authority
by the attorney after its execution; (4) there should be strict control of the
division of fees between attorneys based upon work performed; and (5) upon
completion of the claim or suit an attorney should file an itemized closing
statement with the proper judicial authority and deliver a copy to the client.
Collateral Sources of Recovery. The collateral source rule should be modified
so that evidence of the nature and extent of all benefits and services received or
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to be received by the claimant as a result of the alleged injuries and damages
he sustained be admissible in an action for wrongful death.
Comparative Vegligence. The question of whether the rule of contributory
negligence should be abandoned is a matter for local determination. However.
when the rule is to be changed, the present Wisconsin comparative negligence
rule and procedure is preferable and should be substituted.
Advance Payments. Liability insurers should be given the right to make advance payments for economic loss to claimants without the possibility that the
claimant will be allowed to introduce evidence of the advance payments on the
issue of liability during subsequent litigation. Liability insurers making advance
payments should be allowed to take a credit therefore against any subsequent
judgment recovered by the claimant or settlement made with him.
Elimination of Ad Danium. Any pleading demanding relief in the form of
unliquidated damages may only make a prayer for general relief and state that
the amount claimed is within the minimum and maximum jurisdictional limits
of the court.
Fraudulent Claims. Strict sanctions should be imposed upon those who intentionally make claims for personal injury or property damage known by them
to be false or fraudulent and upon those who assist in the making of such claims
with knowledge of their false or fraudulent character.
Efficient Use of Legal Ejobrt. Practices and procedures which provide for limitation on the right to voluntary dismissals or nonsuits. the right to a split trial
on issues of liability and damages, modification of appeal bond rules. summary
judg -nent. mental and physical examinations of litigants, demands to admit the
genuineness of documents or relevant facts, and offers of settlement, judgment,
and damages should be adopted in those jurisdictions which do not have such
rules and also in those jurisdictions whose present rules are not as workable as
those which are proposed.
Regulation of A wards Jbr Pain and Sujfering. An attempt should be made to
formulate a plan which will serve as a guide to the appraisal of fair compensation for pain, suffering, and inconvenience which results from the injury sustained through the fault of another.
Published in 1969, Responsible Rejbrm is being examined by the defense bar
in light of current studies, statistics, and proposals. It is still viable and presents
the basis for change without destroying the concepts of justice and equity for
the motoring public-each and every one of us in these United States.
Changes being considered include required liability and first-party coverages.
expansion of first-party coverage, and expanded uninsured and underinsured
motorists provisions. In addition, a formula approach. based upon medical
expense which is the only constant factor in personal injury cases, is being
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studied for general damages (pain, suffering, etc.) in the small case. The problem of coordinating benefits to prevent double recovery is being emphasized so
that the automobile will pay its own way through the medium of making
automobile insurance primary.
It is not my intent to infer that the defense lawyer proposals constitute a
complete approach to improving the present automobile reparations system. If
adopted and implemented. however, they would accomplish the following: insurance and legal costs would be reduced; deserving claimants would receive
their due quickly; court delay would be reduced where it exists; the legal process
would be streamlined; and justice would be retained.
In the passionate. sometimes irrational debate that rages in this field of
endeavor, the defense bar has provided the calm expertise and resourceful leadership to resolve the argument in favor of reason and the public good. All of
this has been done only after long. hard hours of study and determination by
busy trial attorneys who gave of their time and effort without remuneration.
Their concern was to serve the public interest which must in the end prevail.

BOOK REVIEWS
Reply of Jeffrey O'Connell to a Review by James Ghiardi
of O'Connell's THE INJURY INDUSTRY
Little is served by a lengthy reply to Professor Ghiardi's review of my book.
My book speaks for itself . . . as does his review. But I do take exception to
his misstating my book: For example. he states:
Picking up [D.P.] Moynihan's expletives [in the Foreword] that the
courts are overwhelmed, swamped, inundated and choked. Professor
O'Connell adds that "the courts, after all, are not clogged with any
but auto insurance claims," despite common knowledge that the
real culprits are the growth of criminal as well as other types of law
suits.I
Professor Ghiardi would have the reader believe that I unfairly (or incompetently or both) ignored the effect of the rising tide of criminal cases on court
congestion. But the language which he quotes to prove my unfairness is itself
unfairly taken totally out of context by him. The actual passage reads as
follows:
Let's structure [auto insurance] . . . so that we don't need [lawyers]
• . . as a normal necessity, but only as a last resort: as with accident
& health insurance-and almost every form of insurance. How often
does anyone have to hire a lawyer to get a health insurance claim
paid? Or a fire insurance claim? Or a life insurance claim? Rarely
indeed. The courts after all, are not clogged with any but auto
2
insurance claims.
Thus it can be seen that I was not saying only auto insurance cases, among all
types of cases, both civil and criminal, clog the courts; on the contrary I was
clearly saying that among insurance claims, only auto insurance claims clog the
courts. In addition, far from ignoring the effect of criminal cases. I devote
considerable space in the book to a discussion of the problems of court conges3
tion stemming from criminal cases
Professor Ghiardi next states:
Apparently in the belief that men can be moved to agreement
1. Ghiardi, Book Review and Commentary, 21 CATH-OLC U. L. REV. 333 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Book Review].
2. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 7-8 (1972) (emphasis in the original).
3. Id. at 135-37.
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through being pole-axed. Professor O'Connell dubs the present system cruel, corrupt. self-righteous, dilatory, expensive, and wasteful.'
Well, if my words are too strong for Professor Ghiardi, let the reader judge
if they are really too strong when compared to the summary conclusion of the
two-year study of the tort liability system as applied to auto accidents by the
U.S. Department of Transportation:
In summary, the existing system ill serves the accident victim, the
insuring public and society. It is inefficient, overly costly, incomplete
and slow. It allocates benefits poorly, discourages rehabilitation and
overburdens the courts and the legal system. Both on the record of
its performance and on the logic of its operation, it does little if
anything to minimize crash losses.'
What Professor Ghiardi fails to understand . . . with the ineffable blindness
endemic to his ilk . . . is that everyone, except those living off the present
system. is bound to be moved to strong and impassioned language on examining
the way it operates. And on that score, it isn't that Professor Ghiardi is incapable of impassioned language himself: it's just that he reserves his ardor for a
different object. Listen again to the peroration of Professor Ghiardi, who lists
both his titles-namely, Professor of Law and Director of Research for the
Defense Bar:
In the passionate. sometimes irrational debate that rages in this field
of endeavour, the defense bar has provided the calm expertise and
resourceful leadership to resolve the argument in favor of reason and
the public good. All this has been done only after long, hard hours
of study and determination by busy trial attorneys who gave of their
time and effort without remuneration.6
Touching, isn't it? And one of the most gallant tributes I've ever read from
an employee to his employer.

4.
5.

Book Review, supra note I, at 333.
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES
TION IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (March 1971) (prepared by J. Volpe).
6. Book Review, supra note I, at 333.

AND THEIR COMPENSA-

In Defense of No-Fault: A Response to Simonett and
Sargent

Jack Davies

The April 1970 issue of the Minnesota Law Review published the Minnesota
no-fault auto insurance bill complete with my authors's comments., The article
stimulated a frontal attack on the no-fault principle in The Minnesota Plan: A
Responsible Alternative to No Fault Insurance by John E. Simonett and Professor David J. Sargent.2 I welcome the opportunity to respond directly to their
vigorous attempt to make an intellectual case against no-fault. My response has
two thrusts: first, that Simonett and Sargent are tritely moralistic; second, that
they use bad evidence.
MoralisticArguments
The moralistic attack on no-fault is at its sloganeering best in Richard Markus'
effort on behalf of the plaintiff trial bar to label no-fault as "no-guilt.", Simonett and Sargent take up that theme with enthusiasm, and with persistence.
Page by page through their article the following preachments are found: responsibility for his carelessness, legal and moral obligation,4 personal accountability, personal responsibility,5 personal fault, guilt in the criminal case, apportion
responsibility, personal fault, personal moral sense,6 deep-seated conviction,
should be responsible for his conduct, carelessness, sensible rule of decent conduct, ethical thought of our community, vindicate innocence, innocence is irrelevant,7 irresponsible drivers, never accountable, more nearly eliminates personal responsibility,' moral philosophy, accountability for personal conduct,
bears a responsibility, personal responsibility, hold a person responsible, chance
I. Davies, The Minnesota Proposal for No-fault Auto Insurance. 54 MINN. L. Rav. 921 (1970).
2. Simonett & Sargent, The Minnesota Plan: A Responsible Alternative to No-Jault Insurance.
55 MINN.L. REv. 991 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SIMONETr & SARGENT].
3. Markus, As I See 1t.
7 TRIAL SI (May-June 1971).
4. SIMONETT & SARGENT at 991.
5. Id. at 992.
6. Id. at 993.
7. Id. at 994.
8. Id. at 995.

Book Review

19721

to become morally mature, will be excused, 9 responsibility and accountability,
critical moral judgment, personal responsibility, the individual's responsibility,
insurance tied to personal conduct,' 0 wholly to blame," personal responsibility,
recognizes personal responsibility,'" personal responsibility, more to blame.' 3
This moral fervor apparently has its basis in a search for deterrence and
retribution. Simonett and Sargent suggest a deterrent objective to be accomplished through financial accountability of the "wrongdoer."" But the fault
system has no advantage over no-fault as a deterrent. Under a first party nofault system most policies will include a $50 or $100 deductible provision. This
$50 or $100 uninsured loss will be applicable to almost all drivers-those in the
wrong and those in the right. To the extent exposure to financial loss can deter
faulty driving, no-fault produces a broader deterrent pressure than the present
system. If we seek to deter, the "innocent" driver should be included. His role
in highway accidents is highlighted by the following classic:
He was right, dead right
As he sped along.
But he's just as dead
5
As if he'd been wrong.1
That verse also illustrates the life and death deterrent present with each driver
who has any awareness of consequences. Danger is a deterrent which makes the
civil liability for negligent driving nothing more than a theoretical factor among
many cumulative deterrents-such as the threat of injury, bent fenders, inconvenience, traffic fines, driving pride, back seat scolds, and insurance risk rating.
The United States Department of Transportation auto insurance study included a look at deterrence. The conclusion was:
In order to be effective, deterrence depends upon the presence of
three factors. First, there must be strong societal sanction for the
use of punitive or deterrent methods. Second, the potential offender
must be sufficiently susceptible to societal sanctions and pressures
so that he will respond to the fullest extent to which he is capable to
the wishes of the community. Finally, the potential offender must
in fact be capable of changing his behavior in the intended direction.
The actual effects of deterrent measures on the general driving public
are poorly understood. There is, however, strong evidence that with
9. Id. at 996.
10. Id. at 997.
II. Id. at 998.
12. Id. at 1004.
13. Id. at 1005.
14. Id.at 996.
15. Burma Shave (1938).
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respect to highway safety no one of the three factors described above
exists to a sufficient degree to permit deterrence to function very
effectively. As we shall show in this section, our society does not
really sanction strong deterrent measures; the most flagrant offenders are affected only minimally, if at all, by societal pressures; and
many among those who would respond to the wishes of the community are prevented from doing so by either personal or environmental
factors or both. 6
Simonett and Sargent seek primary justification for fault, not in deterrence,
but in the principle of retribution. 7 In effect they divide the population into two
groups: the righteous and pure, who never cause accidents, and the evil and
corrupt who alone are responsible for mayhem on the highway. This theme,
which takes up half of the Simonett and Sargent article, is so absurd in its
ethical, moral, psychological, and common sense foundations that it deserves
little comment.'
Still the reader should be reminded that Simonett and Sargent endorse an
overlay of first-party, no-fault insurance payable to lawsuit losers as an addition to the fault system.' 9 They also favor liability coverage so the lawsuit loser
will not have to bear any immediate financial burden."' Simonett and Sargent
believe in hell fire. but want the insurance system to provide air conditioning.
Bad Evidence
The bad evidence found in The Minnesota Plan relates to the following issues:
public opinion toward no-fault, comparative benefits under fault and no-fault
systems, the Massachusetts no-fault experience, and the constitutionality of nofault.
Public Opinion
On the question of public opinion Simonett and Sargent quote a Minnesota
Tribune poll of September, 1968.1 The existence of a later Minnesota poll is
relevant in judging the integrity of their presentation. It is difficult to justify
the omission of a poll published April 6, 1969, in which 62 percent favored no16. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY CRASHES
118(1970).
17. SIMONETT & SARGENT at 996.
18. "A typical driver has a better than even chance of having an accident every three years;
just about every driver will have an accident sometime." N.Y. DEP'T OF INS., AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE-FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 3 (1970).
19.

SIMONETT & SARGENT at 1006.

20. Id. at 1005-06.
2 I.Id. at 994.
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fault and 31 percent opposed it. This poll appeared a year after the one cited
by Simonett and Sargent and two years before their article. If they believe
public opinion is relevant on the issue of no-fault, as they apparently do, the
authors should rely on the best evidence of current attitudes.
The most recent Minnesota polls, published after the Simonett and Sargent
article, show 54 and 53 percent favorable, 30 and 29 percent unfavorable and
16 and 18 percent undecided. 2 2 These recent polls provide impressive, and current, evidence of public support for adoption of no-fault auto insurance.
Comparative Benefits
Simonett and Sargent attack no-fault benefits as inadequate. This point is made
with three selected hypotheticals32 No comparison is made between the typical
benefits provided by the fault system and the benefits offered by no-fault. I
concede that one out of ten seriously injured persons receives a greater net
recovery under today's fault system than a pure no-fault bill would provide
them.2" In a lottery system -like today's fault system -there will be winners.
But there are losers as well. We cannot preserve a lottery with 90 percent losers
among the seriously injured on the basis of the attractiveness of the system for
those who win the jackpot and the lawyers who represent them.
The evidence on comparative benefits presented in The Minnesota Plan is bad
evidence-selective hypotheticals. Good evidence is available. Simonett and
Sargent ignore the Department of Transportation study on the comparative
benefits issue: "The Economic Consequences of Automobile Injuries," 5 although the study is cited by them at other points. This study shows that victims
of serious traffic crashes and their dependents in 1967 recovered from auto
liability insurance an average of approximately 15% of their economic losses .2
By ignoring that study Simonett and Sargent attempt to sweep under the rug
the best available information on how the present system operates. Also ignored
is evidence from Professor Conard, that from the New York Department of
22.

Minneapolis Tribune, April 18, 1971, at 25, col. 2; June 27, 1971, at 8, col. 3.

23.
24.

SIMONETT & SARGENT at

998.
Maynes & Williams, Fault or No-Fault, PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE REFORM 87 (1970). Quoting T. Lawrence Jones, President, American
Insurance Association.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF

TRANSPORTATION,

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE

INJURIES, REPORT OF THE WESTAT RESEARCH CORPORATION, Vols.

ACCIDENT

1,1 (1970).

26. Id. at 38 and 45. Forty percent economic losses is recovered (at 38). Thirty-two percent of
recovery is on tort claims (at 45).
27. A. CONARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT
COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATIONS

192-99 (1964).
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Insurance, " that from the American Insurance Association,2" and that from the
30
American Bar Association committee on auto reparations.
Massachusetts
The evidence of Simonett and Sargent as to experience under the Massachusetts
no-fault law is limited to reporting a 38.4 percent increase in property damage
premiums instituted before the effective date of no-fault. 3 ' Property damage
costs were not affected by the Massachusett's no-fault system at the time Simonett and Sargent wrote. Their apparent motive is to suggest the 38.4 percent
increase is relevant evidence on the cost of no-fault.
Motive aside, later evidence destroys the Simonett and Sargent suggestion of
increased cost under the Massachusetts no-fault system. The most recent report
proves there will be significant savings from that partial no-fault plan. The 1971
rates for bodily injury coverage were 15 percent less than the liability rates in
effect in 1970. Now insurance commissioner John G. Ryan has proposed a
further decrease of 27.6 percent for no-fault bodily injury premiums for 1972.
Industry spokesmen have proposed an average reduction of 18.5 percent. Were
the lower industry proposal adopted the total reduction after two years under
32
modified no-fault will approximate 30 percent.
Simonett and Sargent also cite as evidence on no-fault costs a study by the
American Mutual Insurance Alliance.1 The AMIA was opposed to no-fault
when the study was released. Simonett and Sargent say the AMIA found that
a pure no-fault plan "would increase costs some 29 percent.1 3 4 Anyone citing
this study should note that the 29 percent increase was not in overall costs, but
in "the cost of basic bodily injury coverage."3' This increase in one item of cost
was offset by overhead reductions and other savings so that in this study, the
AMIA conceded aggregate savings of 5 percent for a substantial class of insureds and modest 5 percent to 9 percent increases for the other two classifica30
tions in its study.
28. N.Y. DEP'T OF
29.

INS.,

supra note 18 at 25-29.

AMERICAN

INS. ASS'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND EVALUATE THE
KEETON-O'CONNELL BASIC PROTECTION PLAN AND AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS 1

(1968).
30. A.B.A.
31.

COMM. ON AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS

SIMONETT & SARGENTat

104 (1969).

1002.

32. The National Underwriter, Dec. 3, 1971, at I.
33.

SIMONETT & SARGENT at

1000.

34. Id. at 1000.
35. AMERICAN MUTUAL INS. ALLIANCE, ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE COST.
INGS OF THE AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATIONS COMPLETE PERSONAL PROTECTION AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE PLAN 1 (1969).

36. Id.

19721
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There is good evidence pointing to significant premium savings from a nofault system. 37 Most dramatic is the public pledge by two large insurance companies that if the Minnesota no-fault bill were adopted their auto insurance
premiums in Minnesota would be reduced from 22 to 25 percent. 38
Constitutionality
Since the Simonett and Sargent article appeared with its discussion of constitutionality, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that the
Massachusetts law was constitutional in Pinnick v. Cleary.31 Unfortunately,
Simonett and Sargent did not have that authority available to them when
preparing their article. They did have available the Department of Transportation study, "Constitutional Problems in Automobile Accident Compensation
Reform," 40 which was published a ye~ir before their article. The three constitutional law experts who authored that 94-page study concluded that the no-fault
reforms would not conflict with constitutional mandates." Simonett and Sargent chose to ignore the existence of the study.
Conclusion
Support for no-fault grows with each passing month. The Nixon administration," powerful members of Congress, 3 insurance commissioners," consumer
45
groups,'
business groups, 4 and state legislatures 47 have endorsed no-fault since
the start of this year. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, with special financing from the Department of Transportation, is
8
drafting a uniform no-fault act.4
37.

Texas Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Transcript of Proceedings, National No-Fault Conference
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175 § I I3B (1971).
38. The companies are Aetna Life and Casualty and the St. Paul Companies, Minneapolis
Tribune, April 14, 1971, at I, col. I.
39. ___-Mass.272 N.E.2d 592 (1971).

134-298 (1971). MASS.

40.

U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

COMPENSATION REFORM (1970).

41. The authors are: Lindsey Cowen, Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., and C. Dallas Sands.
42. See Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1971, at 3, col. 2.

43.

Notably Senator Warren Magnuson who assumed joint sponsorship with Philip Hart on

February 24, 197 1.
44. RESOLUTION OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, adopted June
17, 1971.
45. AFL-CIO; United Auto Workers; Consumer Federation of America; Consumers Union;
National Council of Senior Citizens; American Automobile Association.
46. Chambers of Commerce, e.g., Greater Philadelphia and Los Angeles Area; American
Society of Insurance Management; Car and Truck Rental and Leasing Association
47. The Florida no-fault bill was signed on June 24, 1971. Study commissions have been
established in 17 states this year.
48. Seepage -_ for discussion of the NCCUSL project.
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Growth in support for no-fault parallels growth of the evidence in favor of
the no-fault principle. Lawyers can ignore that evidence only at the price of
great embarrassment to the legal profession.' 9 Press exposure of the lawyer selfinterest on this issue becomes inevitable as the bar stands increasingly alone in
its opposition to no-fault reform."
The merits of the no-fault reform are made obvious by the weak foundations
of the case against no-fault, apparent even in such a strenuous effort as the
Simonett and Sargent article. Since a legitimate case cannot be made against
no-fault, individual lawyers should the public interest -and for the self respect
5
of the profession-repudiate the position of the organized bar .

49. "A concerted drive by trial lawyers to block any major change in the way auto accident
damages are handled is frustrating the Nixon administration's hope of getting major insurance
reform on a state-by-state basis." Ottenberg, The No-Fault Insurance Fight, Washington Star,
July 6, 1971, at 1, col. I.
50. Minneapolis Tribune, May 7, 1971, at I, col. 4.
51. In Massachusetts a lawyers' for no-fault committee was organized, I know of no similarly
statesman-like performance elsewhere.

